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Abstract
Recent trade-in-tasks models suggest that relative low-skill wages (in rich
high-skill abundant countries) may increase when low-skill tasks are oﬀshored.
However, using extensive numerical simulations of these models we ﬁnd that
wage inequality is increasing for almost all endowment combinations (i.e. rela-
tive country sizes) when we use a broad range of parameter values and model
speciﬁcations. The most common exception is when the country is relatively
small and cannot aﬀect international prices. In the case of relatively poor low-
skill abundant countries, we ﬁnd that oﬀshoring is always welfare improving,
but wage inequality eﬀects are ambiguous. Finally, we ﬁnd that a trade-in-
tasks model with three skill-types can also account for wage polarization when
we allow medium-skill tasks to be oﬀshored.
Keywords: Oﬀshoring, trade-in-tasks, wage inequality
JEL Classiﬁcation: F11, F16, J31
1 Introduction
Traditional trade theory is based on ﬁnal goods trade. However, the growing impor-
tance of trade in intermediate goods and services –associated with the fragmentation
of production into diﬀerent countries– is a well known empirical fact. Accordingly,
several papers incorporated trade in intermediate goods in the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
theoretical framework.1 The latest contribution to this topic is the trade-in-tasks
model by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008), henceforth GRH, who intro-
duce tasks directly into the HO framework.
∗Valuable comments were received from David Autor, Joseph Francois, Maurice Kugler, Esteban
Rossi-Hansberg and Anna Salomons. Within the CPB, the paper has been greatly improved thanks
to the comments and suggestions from Stefan Boeters, Casper van Ewijk, Arjan Lejour and Paul
Veenendaal. James Markusen kindly provided the GAMS code for the alternative trade-in-tasks
models in the Appendix, and Semih Akcomak provided valuable estimations and graphs using the
British Skills Survey data.
1Among others, Dixit and Grossman (1982), Helpman (1984), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990),
Deardorﬀ (2001a,b), Venables (1999), Kohler (2004), Antràs et al. (2006), Markusen (2006),
Markusen and Venables (2007).
1The trade volumes and welfare implications of the GRH model and other recent
trade-in-tasks models have been already evaluated by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2010) and Markusen (2010). For instance, Markusen (2010) analyses oﬀshoring as
an expansion of trade at the extensive margin and ﬁnds that oﬀshoring is welfare
increasing when terms-of-trade are not deteriorating. When Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2010) use the insight that oﬀshoring can be associated with "shadow migra-
tion", they ﬁnd that the traditional HO theorems also apply to trade-in-tasks. Thus,
oﬀshoring produces similar gains-from-trade eﬃciency eﬀects as in the traditional
trade models. However, if oﬀshoring is also increasing factor (wage) inequality, then
a trade-oﬀ arises between eﬃciency and equity concerns.
In this paper we analyse the impact of oﬀshoring on wage inequality using these
recent trade-in-tasks theoretical models. The complexity of the GRH and other
alternative trade-in-tasks models, however, does not allow for full analytical solutions
with clear-cut predictions. The only exception is a special case in the GRH model
where the relative wage of low-skill labour increases with oﬀshoring for a small
open economy and when there is non-specialization in production. This is an eye-
catching result, but there are no wage inequality predictions when the model analyses
endogenous international price determination and product specialization (i.e. corner
solutions in production).
In addition, this GRH special case is at odds with the empirical evidence. The
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wage inequality was ﬁrst empirically analyzed by Feenstra and
Hanson (1999). They found that in the US in the period 1970-1990, 35% of wage
inequality was due to skill-biased technological change and only 15% to oﬀshoring.
These results are in accordance to the general view that wage inequality has been
strongly inﬂuenced by technology (i.e. computers), while globalization (including
both traditional trade and oﬀshoring) has had only a minor impact. More recently,
? ﬁnd some evidence of oﬀshoring explaining job polarization, although the impact
is much smaller than the routinization eﬀect ﬁrst suggested by Autor et al. (2003).2
On the other hand, Firpo et al. (2010) ﬁnd that oﬀshoring has played a substantial
role in the changes in wage inequality after the 1990s and specially, in the 2000s.
Therefore, even though the magnitude of the oﬀshoring eﬀects on wage inequality is
not clear yet, all the empirical studies found that oﬀshoring increased wage inequal-
ity. Moreover, the magnitude and scope of the oﬀshoring impact may increase in the
near future when high-skill jobs are expected to become more oﬀshorable (cf. Blin-
der, 2006, 2009). This makes the distributional impact of oﬀshoring an important
and relevant topic.
The ﬁrst objective of this paper, therefore, is to run extensive numerical simula-
tions using GAMS to evaluate the relative wage eﬀects of the GRH model for a wide
range of parameter values and diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. We want to analyse if
2They argue that routine tasks are more easily substituted by computers, and this explains why
ICT developments had a strong negative employment and wage eﬀect on middle-skills routine jobs.
In a related paper, Liu and Treﬂer (2008) examine the employment eﬀects of service oﬀshoring by
US companies and ﬁnd only small eﬀects of service oﬀshoring on wages. When they estimate the
eﬀects of inshoring, the net eﬀect is positive.
2moving away from the GRH special case (i.e. small country and non-specialization)
yields results that are consistent with the recent empirical evidence.
Our numerical simulations assume that low-skill tasks (L-tasks) are more easily
oﬀshorable than high-skill tasks (H-tasks), and thus, in a ﬁrst round of simulations
we only allow for L-task oﬀshoring. In every simulation we vary the relative factor
endowments of the domestic (high-skill abundant) country and the general oﬀshoring
costs, which produce diﬀerent levels of oﬀshoring.3 Thereafter each set of simula-
tions combines the use of four diﬀerent oﬀshoring cost schedules, seven combinations
of factor shares, and four diﬀerent elasticities of substitution between factors. In ad-
dition, we also run simulations for a selected set of parameter values where both
low and high-skill tasks can be oﬀshored.4 In total we obtain almost 50.000 gen-
eral equilibrium results for the one-country GHR model and more than 12.000 for
the two-country model. Therefore, even though our simulations do not completely
account for all possible parameter values, with more than 60.000 simulations we
present a very exhaustive numerical analysis of the GRH model.
This rich set of parameter values and oﬀshoring speciﬁcations is used to run the
numerical simulations for both the one-country model (ﬁxed international prices)
and the two-country model (endogenous international prices). For the GRH one-
country case, we replicate the analytical results in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) and ﬁnd that the relative low-skill wage is always increasing (i.e. wage in-
equality is decreasing) when there is non-specialization in production and L-task oﬀ-
shoring. However, when there is specialization in production (the domestic country
is producing only the high-skill intensive good), we already ﬁnd that wage inequality
is increasing, except at very high levels of low-skill task oﬀshoring.
For the two-country case, we ﬁnd the remarkable outcome that with such a broad
range of numerical simulations, relative low-skill wages are decreasing for most rel-
ative country sizes. The common exception is that wage inequality is usually de-
3 Surveying recent empirical studies we calibrate our simulations to limit oﬀshoring to an upper
level of 50% and in most cases the simulations are centered on 25%. This follows the ﬁndings
in Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2009), who estimate diﬀerent oﬀshorability indexes
and ﬁnd that around 25% of US jobs are potentially oﬀshorable. In addition, Jensen and Kletzer
(2010) focus on the services sector and estimate that up to 27% of services jobs are likely to be
oﬀshored. One important distinction of these papers is that oﬀshorability is deﬁned on technical
issues, but not on optimal managerial decisions. In this context Blinder (2009) and Blinder and
Krueger (2009) do not ﬁnd that routine work is more oﬀshorable than other work, while Jensen and
Kletzer (2010) ﬁnd a positive correlation between skills and oﬀshorability. However, that a task
is technically and physically possible to oﬀshore does not mean that it is eﬃcient for the ﬁrm to
oﬀshore it. Following Costinot et al. (2010) the non-routine quality of many tasks can become an
ex-post contractual friction that makes these tasks remain within the multinational headquarters.
This applies in particular for high-skill non-routine tasks and consequently, even when high-skill
tasks are technically possible to oﬀshore the ﬁrm will not do it based on managerial decisions. This
can explain why high-skill non-routine tasks appear to be oﬀshorable ex-ante (as in Jensen and
Kletzer, 2010), but are not actually oﬀshored (Akcomak et al., 2010; Oldenski, 2010).
4 Moreover, we also test if the results are conditional on the assumption that oﬀshoring costs
are the same for both industries. Using estimations provided by Akcomak et al. (2010), we ﬁnd
that oﬀshoring costs are industry-speciﬁc. In particular, low-skill intensive industries have a higher
oﬀshorability index than high-skill intensive industries.
3creasing for relatively small countries (i.e. countries that cannot aﬀect international
prices). Moreover, since we use extreme parameter values, we do not expect the
results to change if we run simulations with parameter values that lay in between
these extremes.5
Thus, the example portrayed in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where oﬀ-
shoring levels decrease wage inequality, is indeed a special case. For the majority of
endowment combinations (relative country sizes) wage inequality is increasing when
the domestic high-skill abundant country oﬀshores its low-skill tasks. The intuition
for these results is that the relative price eﬀect is dominating the productivity ef-
fect associated with oﬀshoring. In particular, when oﬀshoring of low-skill tasks is
increased, the productivity of low-skill workers is increased but this also increases
the production of the low-skill intensive good. In general equilibrium, this increase
in production decreases the relative price of the low-skill intensive good with respect
to the high-skill intensive good, which in turn reduces the relative wage of low-skill
workers.
The main distinction between GRH and other models with intermediate inputs
is that they use heterogeneous trade cost for intermediate inputs, instead of zero
or uniform costs. We compare our results with the simpliﬁed version of the GRH
model that is simulated by Markusen (2010) and with a version of the Markusen
and Venables (2007) model. Using these models, the main pattern of generalized
relative low-skill wage decrease is still present. However, the scope and the scale of
the positive relative wage increases is bigger now, in particular for the Markusen-
Venables model.
The former results concern the eﬀects of oﬀshoring on relatively high-skill abun-
dant countries. When we look at the simulation outcomes for poor (relatively low-
skill abundant) countries, we ﬁnd diﬀerent results. First, oﬀshoring is always welfare
improving in these countries. Second, the wage inequality eﬀects of oﬀshoring are
ambiguous and conditional on the parameter values of the model (most importantly,
on the factor shares in production). Therefore, there is no pattern of wage inequal-
ity eﬀects of oﬀshoring that can be generalized for the case of relatively low-skill
abundant countries.
These trade-in-tasks models are based on a HOS framework with two labour
types. However, following Autor et al. (2006, 2008) recent wage inequality data for
the US shows a polarization pattern where low and high skilled wages are increasing
relative to medium skilled wages.6 The second objective of this paper is to analyse
if the GRH model can accommodate this wage polarization pattern. To do so, we
5In this respect, the only case where our main wage inequality results change is when we use a
very high value of the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skill labour. With values of
σ = 3 or larger we ﬁnd that wage inequality is decreasing for a much broader set of relative country
sizes, and not only for small countries. However, this elasticity value is already more than twice
the value commonly accepted in the empirical labour economics literature (cf. Katz and Murphy,
1992; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).
6This pattern, however, has only been found for the US. There is no such evidence for the UK
(Goos and Manning, 2007) nor Germany (Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010).
4need to expand the GRH model by introducing three skill-groups: low, medium and
high.7 With this model extension we have a richer interplay between skill groups
and oﬀshoring stages, which provides several ways to assess the eﬀects of oﬀshoring
on wage inequality.
We ﬁnd that the GRH three-skill model can accommodate the recent empirical
ﬁndings on wage polarization in the US when M-task oﬀshoring is simulated. M-task
oﬀshoring is related to the routinization process described by Autor et al. (2003),
where medium-skill workers perform routine tasks, which can be substituted by
computers, but are also easier to oﬀshore than low-skill manual tasks and personal
services that require physical proximity (Blinder, 2006). This version of the GRH
trade-in-tasks model can also shed light on the expected eﬀects of a new wave of
globalization where high-skill tasks are increasingly oﬀshored. In this case, we ﬁnd
that for many relative country sizes adding H-task oﬀshoring to existing L and M-
task oﬀshoring results in wage inequality reductions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main features of the
GRH model, while Section 3 explains how the model is calibrated and provides an
overview of the numerical simulations. Section 4 presents the results for the case
of high-skill abundant countries in the one-country model. In Section 5 we analyse
the two-country model with endogenous international prices, for the cases of both
the high and low-skill abundant countries. In Section 6 we introduce three labour
types into the GRH model and identify the simulation outcomes that provide a wage
polarization pattern. We summarize our results in Section 7.
2 The GRH trade-in-tasks model
The Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg paper introduces trade-in-tasks directly into a
HO modelling framework. It does not deal explicitly with intermediate goods, but
they are implicit in their analysis.8 They assume the standard 2x2x2 conditions. Two
countries c: domestic (d) and foreign (f), two sectors j: x and y, and two labour skill
types s: low-skill (L) and high-skill (H).9 Furthermore, there is a perfect mapping
between skills and tasks: low-skill workers do L-tasks and high-skill workers H-tasks.
They also assume that technologies (factor/task requirements) are the same in both
countries.
The main innovation of the GRH model is the introduction of a task oﬀshoring
technology. Firms can perform production tasks either at home or oﬀshore them
to the foreign country. Oﬀshoring is preferred when one or both labour costs are
cheaper in the foreign country. However, to oﬀshore a task, the ﬁrm must pay not
7It is important to keep in mind that dividing workers into three –instead of two– skill groups
makes the deﬁnition of each skill group diﬀerent for each setting. In particular, the L and H-skill
groups in the three-skill model are not the same as the L and H-skill groups in the two-skill model.
8This is made clear when we introduce the two-country equilibrium and the constraints to the
balance of payments.
9Their framework has other production factors, but they do not aﬀect the relative labour inter-
actions. Thus, we use both labour types as the only production factors.
5only the local wages but also the costs related to the monitoring and coordinating
of remote workers.
In the GRH setting, tj(i) captures heterogeneous oﬀshoring costs for the various
tasks i in industry j. All tasks are indexed by i ∈ [0,1], tj(i) is continuously diﬀer-
entiable, and ordered so that the costs of oﬀshoring are non-decreasing:
∂tj(i)
∂i ≥ 0. Finally, tasks have the same oﬀshorability regardless of sector:
tx(i) = ty(i) = t(i). There is a general oﬀshoring cost parameter β, that can be as-
sociated with communication and transportation improvements that proportionally
reduce the cost of oﬀshoring for all tasks.10
Combining these elements they obtain the oﬀshoring zero-proﬁt condition for
low-skill tasks:
βt(iL)pLf ≥ pLd (1)
where t(iL) is the low-skill task-speciﬁc oﬀshoring cost schedule, pLf is the low-skill
wage in the foreign country (f) and pLd is the domestic (d) low-skill wage. With
positive levels of oﬀshoring, in equilibrium, equation (1) holds as an equality and IL
is the equilibrium marginal task for which there are equal costs in both locations.
Equivalently to the case of L-task oﬀshoring, the equilibrium condition for H-task
oﬀshoring is given by:
γz(iH)pHf ≥ pHd (2)
where γ is the general oﬀshoring cost of H-tasks, z(iH) is the oﬀshoring cost function
for H-tasks indexed by iH ∈ [0,1], pHd and pHf are the domestic and foreign H-skill
wages, respectively. Accordingly, IH is the value of iH for which there is a H-task
oﬀshoring equilibrium.
We ﬁrst employ a Cobb-Douglas production function: j = ALαjH1−αj where A
is a productivity parameter and αj provides the factor shares in production of sector
j. Then the unit-cost minimization problem of the ﬁrm, when there are oﬀshoring






where Ωs ≤ 1, are the cost-saving variables derived in GRH associated with L and
H-task oﬀshoring.
















10Note that β is a parameter that aﬀects all tasks equally. As pointed by Taylor (2006) shifts in
β can only by achieved by very broad innovations, such as the Internet.
6Factor endowment equilibrium conditions are:
L
(1 − IL)
= Lxx + Lyy (7)
H
(1 − IH)
= Hxx + Hyy (8)




where pj are ﬁnal goods prices and λ is the consumption share of good x in total
consumption.
The main ﬁnding of the GRH model can be summarized by the following equa-
tion:




where b w is the proportional change in the relative wage of low-skilled with respect
to high-skill labour, and b p is the proportional change in relative ﬁnal goods prices.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (10) is the productivity eﬀect
associated with oﬀshoring, µ1 is the common Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect (i.e. rela-
tive wage changes are directly related to changes in ﬁnal goods prices), while µ2 is
the labour-supply eﬀect: oﬀshoring increases the eﬀective supply of labour in the
domestic country.
In a small open economy µ1 = 0 and when there is non-specialization in produc-
tion µ2 = 0. Thus, in this special case only the productivity eﬀect is positive and we
have the GRH eye-catching result that relative low-skill wages increase when L-task
oﬀshoring is positive.
3 Model calibration and simulation overview
We solve the general equilibrium conditions as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP). The general equilibrium system is deﬁned in Table 2 in the Appendix for
the one-country model and in Table 3 for the two-country model.









where ρ is the payment to oﬀshored labour. When ρ = 0 we have balanced trade
in ﬁnal goods: mx + my = 0, where mj is the import (export if negative) of good
j. However, if there is oﬀshoring activities then ρ > 0 and this produces a wedge
between the initial ﬁnal goods trade balance, such that mx +my = −ρ. Then ρ can
be associated with imported intermediate inputs, which in turn create that −mx >
my: exports of ﬁnal goods must exceed imports in order to pay for the imported
intermediate inputs ρ. Finally, throughout our setting welfare (w) is deﬁned as the
representative consumer’s utility.
73.1 Oﬀshoring costs
To run numerical simulations on the GRH model we need to specify the oﬀshoring
cost function. In the GRH model t(i) is only constrained to be non-decreasing in i.
This leaves several modelling possibilities. We use a general oﬀshoring cost function
and apply four diﬀerent parameter combinations, which yield four oﬀshoring cost
schedules. These parameters are calibrated using information we gather from the
literature.
We begin with a general functional form that can allow both linear and non-linear
oﬀshoring costs:
t(iL) = t1 + t2i
t3
L (12)
Combining equations (1) and (12), and taken IL to be the task level at which
equation (1) holds as a strict equality, we have that the β0 upper bound limit, at






















Given that at the equilibrium oﬀshoring task IL, we have that the total oﬀshoring
costs T(IL) =
R IL
0 βt(iL)diL, we obtain:






Finally, the oﬀshoring cost-saving parameter (ΩL) is:




In every simulation we assume that t(iL) is ﬁxed, while the β parameter is used





Using diﬀerent parameter combinations in equation (12) we obtain four diﬀerent
oﬀshoring cost schedules (OC1 to OC4). We start with two linear speciﬁcations
where t3 = 1. Then we calibrate t1 = 1 so at β = pLd/pLf we have no oﬀshoring
activity. Then we use two diﬀerent values for t2 = {1,4}. This yields two oﬀshoring
cost schedules that provide relatively extreme outcomes. For OC1 (t1 = 1,t2 = 1,
and t3 = 1) we have that oﬀshoring activity is relatively sensitive to changes in β,
while for OC2 (t1 = 1,t2 = 4, and t3 = 1) oﬀshoring slowly increases with reductions
in β. The second set of cost schedules is non-linear. For OC3 (t1 = 1,t2 = 7, and
t3 = 1.5) oﬀshoring is relatively inelastic to β changes, while for OC4 (t1 = 1,t2 = 7,
8and t3 = 2.5) we have that oﬀshoring is initially very sensitive to changes in β, but
later on only large reductions in β increase oﬀshoring. The four oﬀshoring cost
schedules are depicted in Figure 1.
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In Figure 1 we also depict two diﬀerent β values (wage diﬀerentials are held
constant in the ﬁgure). For β1 we have that there is no oﬀshoring activity at any
cost schedule. When the general oﬀshoring costs are decreased to β2, the linear OC1
schedule has the biggest oﬀshoring levels (around 0.5), while the linear schedule OC2
has the lowest oﬀshoring levels (around 0.1).
We also assume that the domestic wage for each factor s is higher than the foreign
wage, in particular psd/psf = 1.5. This wage diﬀerential is the main driving force
in the oﬀshoring process, only hindered by the level of the β parameter. However,
note that the magnitude of this inter-country wage diﬀerential does not aﬀect the







where β∗ is the equilibrium value of the general oﬀshoring cost parameter. Since the
wage diﬀerential is ﬁxed by the internationally determined prices of ﬁnal goods (in
our one-country model), then any wage diﬀerential value can be accommodated by
adjusting β∗. For the two-country model, we need to run an additional calibration
where we ﬁrst ﬁnd the β∗ value that yields no oﬀshoring activity at the equilibrium
wage diﬀerential.
9Throughout this paper we assume that the oﬀshoring cost function is the same
for L and H-tasks: t(iL) = z(iH). But the general oﬀshoring parameters for both
skill types are diﬀerent: β 6= γ. Using these parameters we can change the oﬀshoring
levels for both types of workers.
However, we need more information about the oﬀshoring costs of L and H-tasks.
Intuitively one expects lower skilled jobs to be more easy to oﬀshore, since these
jobs are usually not critical to the organization of the ﬁrm. Surveying the empirical
literature, we ﬁnd support for more oﬀshoring in L-tasks than in H-tasks. For
instance, Akcomak et al. (2010) use a rich task classiﬁcation and ﬁnd that tasks
associated with low-skill workers are more oﬀshorable than those associated with
high-skill workers.11 In addition, when they compare data from 1997 and 2005, they
ﬁnd that the task oﬀshorability of high-skill workers has increased relatively more
than for low-skill workers. Oldenski (2010) uses a routine and non-routine task
classiﬁcation and ﬁnds that routine tasks (associated with low-skill workers) are
more easily oﬀshored than non-routine tasks (associated with high-skill workers).
Using these results, we ﬁrst assume in our simulations that only L-tasks are
being oﬀshored. We do this by assuming a γ value large enough to make H-task
oﬀshoring too costly. Later we have a sequential oﬀshoring stage where both L and
H-tasks are oﬀshored, but the oﬀshoring costs of L-tasks are lower than for H-tasks
(i.e. β < γ), which yields more oﬀshoring of L-tasks than H-tasks (IL > IH).
3.2 Parameter changes used in the simulations
Throughout all our numerical simulations we use a series of parameter values and
functional forms. In each simulation (i.e. a single output graph) we vary our main
exogenous variable: the general oﬀshoring cost parameter (β for L-skill tasks and γ
for H-skill tasks); and we also change the relative factor endowment (L/H) to check
if the results are sensitive to relative factor abundance. However, L/H is calibrated
to always ensure that the domestic country is exporting the H-intensive good and
thus, can still be deﬁned as the high-skill abundant (rich) country.12
Then we have simulation-speciﬁc parameter values, which we present as a diﬀer-
ent output graph. First, we always use the four oﬀshoring cost schedules described
above (OC1 to OC4). Second, we use up to seven sets of factor shares of produc-
tion.13 Third, we initially use Cobb-Douglas production functions (σ = 1). However,
the empirical labour economics literature commonly uses an elasticity of 1.44 (Katz
11Their results are presented in Figure 6 in the Appendix.
12 Hence, for the one-country model we present our results in three-dimensional graphs, where the
x-axis gives the β values, the y-axis the relative factor abundance L/H and the z-axis the variable
of interest, which usually is the relative wage (pLd/pHd). For the two-country model we also have
three-dimensional graphs where the z-axis shows the variable of interest, but the x and y-axis give
the relative share of low and high-skill workers. While we use diﬀerent graphs for three diﬀerent
oﬀshoring levels associated with diﬀerent changes in the β values.
13These are: (αx = 0.2,αy = 0.7), (αx = 0.3,αy = 0.6), (αx = 0.3,αy = 0.7), (αx = 0.4,αy =
0.6), (αx = 0.2,αy = 0.8), and what deﬁne as the extreme values: (αx = 0.4,αy = 0.5) and
(αx = 0.1,αy = 0.9).
10and Murphy, 1992; Caselli and Coleman, 2006) between both skill levels. Therefore,
in order to evaluate relative wage changes with other values for σ, we include CES
functions in our general equilibrium system and we evaluate three additional elas-
ticity values (i.e. σ = 1.44,2,3). We consider σ = 3 to be an extreme value since it
is more than double the standard value used in the literature.
Finally, we initially allow only L-task oﬀshoring, and later we have sequential
oﬀshoring, where both labour types can be oﬀshored but in a way that L-task oﬀ-
shoring always precedes and is larger than H-task oﬀshoring (i.e. IL ≥ IH).
This broad selection of parameters allows us to provide a very exhaustive analy-
sis of the general equilibrium results when oﬀshoring is increased in the GRH model.
For instance, in the one-country model we have 21 relative factor combinations (L/H
values) and 21 β values for each simulation. Then we can use our four diﬀerent oﬀ-
shoring costs (OC1 to OC4), the seven diﬀerent sets of factor shares, and the four
diﬀerent elasticities of substitution. In total, this yields 49.392 diﬀerent general
equilibrium points. In addition, for a selected set of parameters we also run simula-
tions using two oﬀshoring sequences (only L-task oﬀshoring and both L and H-task
oﬀshoring), and two diﬀerent combinations of industry-oﬀshoring (one with equal
oﬀshoring costs by industry and another with diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs). For the
two-country model we limit the change in β to only three values, and as explained
later we divide total world endowments into 81 endowment combinations, of which
36 correspond to the home country being relatively high-skill abundant. In total,
and using the same changes in the other parameter as in the one-country model,
this yields 12.096 diﬀerent general equilibrium points.
To sum up, even though our simulations do not completely account for all the
possible parameter variations, with more than 60.000 simulations we present a very
exhaustive numerical analysis of the GRH model. What is truly remarkable is
that with this very broad range of parameter variation, our main results are still
robust. Moreover, we do not expect that increasing the available range for certain
parameters can change our main results. For instance, we already use extreme cases
when evaluating factor shares (α values), elasticity of substitution between low and
high-skill labour (σ), general oﬀshoring cost values (β), relative country size (i.e.
relative factor abundance), and oﬀshoring cost schedules (t(iL)).So the only option
left is to increase the number of values within these extremes, but this is very unlikely
to change the main results. Only when we use a very high value of σ = 3 do the
results change in qualitative terms.
4 GRH one-country model results
We ﬁrst assume that the domestic country (d) is a small open economy for which
international price are exogenous. In addition, since we want to analyse the eﬀects of
oﬀshoring on developed countries, we assume that the domestic country is high-skill
labour abundant and exports the high-skill intensive good, which we assume is x,
since we calibrate our numerical simulations using αx < αy.
114.1 GRH one-country simulations with only L-task oﬀshoring
We run a series of simulations on the one-country model using the functional forms
and parameter values described above. In Figure 7 in the Appendix we present the
changes in oﬀshoring levels, welfare and production when we allow only for L-task
oﬀshoring (i.e. β is decreasing). In this initial set of simulations we also calibrate the
factor shares and the relative factor abundance to obtain general equilibrium out-
comes with non-specialization in production (i.e. both countries produce both ﬁnal
goods). In this case, increased oﬀshoring (as a results of reductions in β) increase
the production of the L-intensive good y and reduces x. In other words, oﬀshoring
of L-skill tasks, makes the H-skill abundant country increase the production of the
low-skill intensive good. This is the opposite result of a traditional trade in ﬁnal
goods liberalization (if for instance, there is an initial tariﬀ on the import of the
low-skill intensive good y). As a consequence, this shift in the production patterns
of the small-open economy yields another interesting result: oﬀshoring reduces trade
in ﬁnal goods. Oﬀshoring by a small-country erodes its endowment-abundancy dif-
ferential with the rest of the world, since it now has more low-skill labour available,
and consequently it produces relative more of the labour-abundant good and thus,
reduces its imports of this good and trades less in ﬁnal goods.
Next, we analyse the eﬀects of increased oﬀshoring on relative wages. Figure
2 presents the changes in relative wages (pLd/pHd) when we only allow for L-task
oﬀshoring. In each of the graphs we have the four diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs. The
linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (OC1 and OC2) are above and the non-linear (OC3
and OC4) below. In all cases relative low-skill wages are increasing.
This is the special case in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a small open
country with non-specialization. Here only the oﬀshoring productivity eﬀect (ΩL)
is present and we have the counter-intuitive result that increased oﬀshoring of low-
skill tasks increases the relative wages of low-skill workers with respect to high-skill
workers. Recall that this is the only general wage inequality result that can be
derived analytically from the GRH model.
However, when we move away from the non-specialization assumption, this spe-
cial case does not hold any more. In Figure 3, with αx = 0.4 and αy = 0.5, the
production functions of both goods are similar and the ranges of specialized produc-
tion are increased. Hence, we obtain corner solutions where the domestic country is
producing only one of the goods. The specialization region that we are interested in
is the corner where relative labour (L/H) is low, and the domestic country is special-
ized in the production of the high-skill abundant good x. The other corner solution
is of no interest to us, since it means that the domestic country is only producing the
low-skill abundant good y and thus, we cannot associate this specialization region
with a high-skill labour abundant country.
In the case of specialization in the high-skill intensive good x, we have the GRH
positive labour supply eﬀect (from equation (10) µ2 > 0). In all the diﬀerent simu-
lations we conduct (with diﬀerent factor shares α and oﬀshoring cost schedules) we
ﬁnd that the labour supply eﬀect is larger than the productivity eﬀect and low-skill
12Figure 2: GRH one-country model, changes in relative wages with only L-task oﬀ-




































































































































































Offshoring cost schedule: OC4 
Notes: We change β in a way that for all four functions the oﬀshoring levels are similar (beginning
with no oﬀshoring and ending with levels around 0.45). This means that β has to decrease more
for the inelastic cost schedules: OC2 and OC3. Common parameters in all graphs: σ = 1, αx = 0.2
and αy = 0.7.
relative wages are decreasing for low and median oﬀshoring levels. Only at very
high oﬀshoring levels (usually above 0.4) are relative wages increasing. Thus, just
moving away from the non-specialization assumption we do not ﬁnd that increased
oﬀshoring of L-tasks increases the relative L-skill wage.
4.2 Summary of the GRH one-country model simulations
In the one-country GRH model simulation we replicate numerically the counter-
intuitive analytical result of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008): for a small open
economy that produces both goods, with a positive level of oﬀshoring, reductions
in the general oﬀshoring cost parameter (β) result in an increase of the relative
wage of low-skill with respect to high-skill workers. For the case where the capital-
abundant small country does not produce both goods, and is specialized in the
capital-intensive good, we ﬁnd that low-skill relative wage is decreasing for the initial
phase of oﬀshoring, and begins to increase only at very high levels of oﬀshoring.
13Figure 3: GRH one-country model, changes in relative wages with only L-task oﬀ-




































































































































































Offshoring cost schedule: OC4 
Notes: We change β in a way that for all four functions the oﬀshoring levels are similar (beginning
with no oﬀshoring and ending with levels around 0.45). This means that β has to decrease more
for the inelastic cost schedules: OC2 and OC3. Common parameters in all graphs: σ = 1, αx = 0.4
and αy = 0.5.
When low-skill wages are decreasing in this case, we have that the labour-supply
eﬀect (µ2) is larger than the productivity eﬀect (Ω).14
However, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) call this one-country example
as "pedagogic", since it is not plausible that β can decrease for one country while
it remains constant for the rest of the world. Recall that β is a general oﬀshoring
parameter that reduces the cost to oﬀshore all tasks, and thus, can only be related to
broad technology advances (e.g. ICT technologies) that reduce at the same time the
oﬀshorability possibilities for all tasks. Therefore, the wage inequality implications
of increased oﬀshoring possibilities can only be fully analyzed with a two-country
model where β is decreasing for all countries (or set of countries).
14Note that these results are independent of the parameter choices (i.e. production shares and
the elasticity of substitution σ).
145 GRH two-country model results
In this section we calibrate and numerically simulate the GRH model with two coun-
tries, and we assume that only the high-skill abundant domestic country oﬀshores
labour to the other country. Thus, all our oﬀshoring equations from the one-country
MCP remain the same. This also implies that only the domestic country beneﬁts
from the cost-reducing variables ΩL and ΩH. International prices are now deter-
mined as part of the general equilibrium system, and they depend on the relative
sizes of each country, the demand for ﬁnal goods and trade volumes. When one or
both skill types are producing oﬀshored tasks for the domestic economy the foreign
country has less available labour for their production. In return, it receives the
oﬀshoring payments ρ.
The new general equilibrium system (excluding the oﬀshoring equations) is pre-
sented in Table 3 in the Appendix. We calibrate the productivity parameter Ac
such that the domestic country is 50% more productive than the foreign country.
Therefore, we have as in the one-country model that domestic wages are 50% larger
than foreign wages.
To keep the numerical simulations tractable, we now simulate only three diﬀerent
oﬀshoring levels. As before, we reduce the value of the general oﬀshoring costs
parameter (β) to increase oﬀshoring activity in L-tasks. Therefore, each of our three
oﬀshoring level is associated with relative changes in β. Hence, in the low-oﬀshoring
case β is reduced 10% with respect to β0 (the value of β for which there is no
oﬀshoring). In the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the corresponding reductions
in β are 20% and 30%, respectively.15
For the two-country simulations we simulate diﬀerent divisions of the total en-
dowments between both countries. We keep the restriction that the domestic country
is always relatively high-skill abundant with respect to the foreign country. We also
restrict the endowment set such that each country has at least 10% of total endow-
ments for one of the factors. The possible endowment combinations are shown in
Table 1. There are 36 diﬀerent combinations where the domestic country is rela-
tively high-skill abundant. As before we use four diﬀerent oﬀshoring cost schedules
(OC1 to OC4), seven diﬀerent sets of factor shares, four diﬀerent elasticities of sub-
stitution, two oﬀshoring sequences (only L-task oﬀshoring and both L and H-task
oﬀshoring), and two diﬀerent combinations of industry-oﬀshoring. In total, this
yields 12.096 diﬀerent general equilibrium points. Using this total endowment shar-
ing mechanism we obtain diﬀerent relative country sizes and thus, diﬀerent eﬀects
on trade volumes and terms-of-trade (i.e. relative price) eﬀects.
Figure 4 presents the results for relative wages (PLd/PHd) when we use our two
linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (OC1 and OC2). The left hand side column uses
the more sensitive OC1 schedules that yields higher oﬀshoring levels, while the right
15However, since we are also changing relative endowments, factor prices are diﬀerent for each
endowment point and thus, β0 is also changing. Therefore, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the marginal β0 value for
each endowment point and take this value as the starting point to apply the relative reductions.
15Table 1: Endowment sets, "+" denotes the low and high-skill endowments for which
the domestic country is relatively high-skill abundant and for which we run the
numerical simulations
H-skill share of total
L-skill share of total 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 + + + 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 + + + + 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 + + + + + 0 0 0 0
0.3 + + + + + + 0 0 0
0.2 + + + + + + + 0 0
0.1 + + + + + + + + 0
hand side column presents the less sensitive OC2 schedule.16 We also present three
oﬀshoring levels (low, medium and high), and thus, the decreases in β are larger as
we move from the top to the bottom rows in the ﬁgure.
In all the following graphs, we use the no-oﬀshoring case (β0) as our baseline,
and we graph the results of the variable of interest (e.g. relative wages) with respect
to this no-oﬀshoring case. Therefore, for PLd/PHd > 1 we have that the relative
wage of low-skill workers is increasing with respect to the case with no oﬀshoring,
while PLd/PHd < 1 denotes a decrease in the relative wage of low-skill workers. We
analyse now the wage inequality eﬀects of increased oﬀshoring of low-skill tasks.17
16As explained in the previous section we have chosen the oﬀshoring cost schedules so they
represent extreme situations. Thus, for equal reductions in β, the left-hand side graphs show much
higher oﬀshoring activity. For the particular case depicted in Figure 4, the right hand side OC2
schedule yields increases in the oﬀshoring index from 0.05 (for the low oﬀshoring case) to 0.15 (for
the high oﬀshoring case). In other words, 5 to 15% of L-tasks are being oﬀshored. For the OC1
schedule that is more sensitive to changes in β the oﬀshoring index increases much more and also
has more variation by relative endowments (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). In addition, since we
have diﬀerent L-task oﬀshoring levels with diﬀerent relative changes in β, we run another group of
simulations where we calibrate the changes in β to obtain the same changes in L-task oﬀshoring for
all the endowment combinations. This implies a additional set of loops where β is changed in small
steps until the desired oﬀshoring level is attained. However, the results are very similar to when we
just use proportional changes in β.
17 For the same parameter values as in Figure 4, in the Appendix we present the results for
welfare (Figure 9) and terms-of-trade (Figure 10). Figure 9 shows that welfare is increasing for
most endowment sets, and there is only a welfare reduction in the area where the domestic country
has relatively low endowments of L (less than 20% of the total). This welfare changes are mainly
driven by the changes in the terms-of-trade (TOT). In Figure 10 we observe an almost identical
pattern of change in terms-of-trade, as in welfare. These results are very similar to those in Markusen
(2010) where the welfare changes of increased oﬀshoring are strongly correlated with terms-of-trade
eﬀects. These pattern of results for welfare and TOT are roughly the same when we change the
main parameter values.
16Figure 4: GRH two-country model, changes in relative wages with respect to no-
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Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC1: t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC2: t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1). Common parameters in
all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
17From Figure 4 we observe that the relative low-skill wage is decreasing (PLd/PHd <
1) for almost all endowment combinations and the decline becomes more pronounced
as β decreases and we move down to higher oﬀshoring levels. The only exception is
for a few endowment sets where the domestic country is relatively very small (with
fewer than 20% of total endowments for both factors). Only for these particular
endowment combinations is there a relative increase in low-skill wages; and the in-
crease is higher and slightly expands to include other endowment sets as we have
higher L-task oﬀshoring levels.
5.1 Main result for the GRH two-country model
This pattern of decreasing relative low-skill wages for all but the small-country
endowment set is consistent throughout all our simulations. We ﬁnd it for both the
linear and non-linear oﬀshoring costs, for diﬀerent combinations of production shares
(α values) and diﬀerent elasticities of substitution between both skills (σ values).
As an example, in Figure 11 in the Appendix we show the simulations when using
a diﬀerent elasticity (σ = 1), diﬀerent production shares and the two non-linear
oﬀshoring cost schedules (OC3 and OC4) .18 But we still obtain the same pattern
of decreasing relative low-skill wages for most endowment sets and increases only
for relatively small country sizes.
These results are in strong contrast to the overall relative low-skill wage increases
presented in the GRH one-country model. When we introduce two-countries and
thus changes in the relative price of ﬁnal goods (which in this context correspond
to terms-of-trade, since the GRH model assumes that trade-in-tasks does not incur
transport costs) increased low-skill task oﬀshoring reduces the relative low-skill wage
for almost all endowment combinations (i.e. diﬀerent relative country sizes).
The intuition for these results comes directly from equation (10), which summa-
rizes the wage eﬀects of the GRH model. When we move away from the small-country
assumption prices react to the exogenous change in oﬀshoring activities and we now
have a negative and strong relative price eﬀect. In particular, when oﬀshoring of
low-skill tasks is increased, the productivity of low-skill workers is increased but this
also increases the production of the low-skill intensive good (y). In general equilib-
rium, this increase in production decreases the relative price of y with respect to x
(the high-skill intensive good). Thus, we have a negative price eﬀect (µ1b p < 0) and
our results show that this relative price eﬀect is stronger than the productivity eﬀect
(−b Ω). In addition, with the broad number of endowment combinations we simulate
there are cases for which the domestic country specializes in the production of only
one good. In these cases we also have a negative labour-supply eﬀect (µ2
dI
1−I < 0),
which reinforces the decrease of relative low-skill wages.
18 The use of diﬀerent σ values implies that we need to reformulate the general equilibrium
equations. When σ = 1 we have Cobb-Douglas production functions (these are the equations
shown in Table 3 in the Appendix), and for σ > 1 we use CES functions instead. In both cases, we
assume that this elasticity is the same for both sectors.
185.2 Sensitivity of the results to extreme parameter values and dif-
ferent model speciﬁcations
To assess the robustness of these results, we use the most extreme parameter values
to assess if the pattern of general decreasing relative low-skill wages is maintained.
First, we use two extreme production share combinations, which are shown in Fig-
ure 12 in the Appendix. With αx = 0.4 and αy = 0.5 we have that production
in both sectors has very similar low and high-skill requirements, and production
specialization is more common. Therefore, we have that the labour-supply eﬀect is
usually positive and in this case the relative low-skill wage (PLd/PHd) is decreasing
for all endowment sets. On the other hand, the other extreme production shares are
αx = 0.1 and αy = 0.9, where the skill requirements in production are completely
diﬀerent and non-specialization is common. In this case we have that PLd/PHd is
only increasing for countries with low-skill shares.
Next, we use a very high value for the elasticity of substitution (σ = 3) to see
how sensitive the results are to this particular parameter. As explained above, the
common value in the literature is 1.44, but we want to assess how the wage inequality
results hold with an extreme value. The results are presented in Figure 13 in the
Appendix. For this case, we observe that wage inequality (i.e. PLd/PHd < 1) is still
increasing for most endowment sets, but now wage inequality is not only decreasing
for relatively small countries, but also for countries that are close to the symmetric
diagonal, which includes some medium and big countries. However, σ = 3 is already
a value more than double of what is accepted in the literature and with σ = 2 our
results are still robust.
Our next step is to analyse how sensitive the results are when we run simulations
with industry-speciﬁc oﬀshoring cost functions. In the GRH model it is assumed
that the oﬀshoring cost function is the same for each industry: tx(i) = ty(i). The
assumption is based on lack of evidence on the contrary. However, using the oﬀ-
shorability indexes developed in Akcomak et al. (2010) in Figure 14 in the Appendix
we plot industries ranked by their average education levels (as a proxy for skill lev-
els). The ﬁgure suggests that low-skill intensive industries have higher oﬀshorability
possibilities than high-skill intensive industries. We also run simple regressions of
the oﬀshorability index on the education levels and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship between both. In terms of the GRH model this means that: tx(i) > ty(i),
and it is more diﬃcult to oﬀshore tasks in the high-skill intensive industry x.19 Using
the insights from Figure 14 we run a new round of simulations where each industry
has diﬀerent oﬀshoring cost functions with the restriction that tx(i) > ty(i). We
ﬁnd, however, that the pattern of decreasing relative low-skill wages (with respect
to the no-oﬀshoring case) is qualitatively the same as before.
In the Appendix we present two additional sets of simulations. First, in Section
8.4 we allow for both the oﬀshoring of low-skill and high-skill tasks (Figure 15).
Second, in Section 8.5 we present the simulation results using alternative trade-in-
19 Using US data Ottaviano et al. (2010) also ﬁnd industry-level diﬀerences when they estimate
a proxy for oﬀshoring costs.
19tasks models. Markusen (2010) constructed a simpliﬁed version of the GRH model,
where there are two factor-speciﬁc tasks in the production function, and one of each
factor-tasks can be oﬀshored if their trade costs are low enough. This is a discreet
version of the GRH model, where oﬀshoring costs are just trade costs on the factor-
speciﬁc task that can be traded. We also show the results for the Markusen and
Venables (2007) model. As explained there, the results are qualitatively very similar
to the GRH two-country model results.
Finally, even though the focus of this paper is on wage inequality, it is also of
interest to analyse the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on low-skill real wages (PLh/P, where P is a
simple ﬁnal goods price average). In Figure 18 in the Appendix we present the results
using standard parameter values. Comparing with the results for relative wages (see
Figure 4), we ﬁnd that the scope of low-skill real wage increases (PLh/P > 1) is much
larger than for relative wages. Thus, even though wage inequality is increasing with
oﬀshoring for most endowment combinations, real low-skill wages are increasing for a
larger set of endowment combinations. However, this also means that for many cases
(depending on particular parameter values), low-skill real wages are also decreasing.
5.3 GRH two-country model results for low-skill abundant coun-
tries
Until now we have only analyzed the eﬀects for relatively high-skill abundant coun-
tries (i.e. developed countries). However, we also have results for the foreign rel-
atively low-skill abundant country, who is inshoring tasks and receiving the corre-
sponding payment (ρ in our general equilibrium system).20
We ﬁrst analyse wage inequality and ﬁnd very diﬀerent results from the H-
abundant country cases. For many parameter combinations, we ﬁnd that in the
L-abundant country the relative low-skill wage is increasing for endowment com-
binations away , from the symmetric factor abundance axis (see Figure 19 in the
Appendix). The endowment combinations close to the axis are associated with
countries that have similar factor ratios, and thus, do not have large income diﬀer-
ences. In other words, wage inequality is usually decreasing for countries that have
relatively large shares of low-skill workers.
However, this pattern is not robust to changes in parameter values and in partic-
ular, wage inequality results are very sensitive to the production shares (α values).
When we use extreme production shares, the wage inequality results described above
are radically diﬀerent. For the combination αx = 0.4 and αy = 0.5 we have that
wage inequality is always decreasing. But when we use the combination αx = 0.1
and αy = 0.9 we ﬁnd that wage inequality is almost always increasing. Therefore,
the results vary much between these two extremes and we do not ﬁnd any generalized
wage inequality results for the low-skill abundant country.
The only result that can be generalized is that oﬀshoring is always welfare im-
proving in the L-abundant country. Figure 20 in the Appendix shows that welfare
20Note that the terms-of-trade eﬀects are just the inverse of those for the H-abundant country.
20is increasing in L-task oﬀshoring for all endowment combinations. This result is ro-
bust to changes in the production shares, the elasticity of substitution and the four
oﬀshoring cost schedules. Thus, unlike the welfare changes for the rich H-abundant
country, welfare in L-abundant countries is not primarily driven by terms-of-trade
eﬀects. The biggest welfare gains, moreover, are for relatively small countries.
6 GRH with three skill types
In this section we introduce a variant of the GRH where we include a third skill
type: medium-skilled workers (M). With three skills we can analyse richer wage
inequality interactions, including wage polarization: the increase of L-skill and H-
skill wages with respect to M-skill wages. We can also simulate diﬀerent oﬀshoring
stages, where the oﬀshoring of skill-speciﬁc tasks is more complex. For instance,
this GRH model extension can also shed light on the expected eﬀects of a new wave
of globalization where high-skill tasks are increasingly oﬀshored.
First, we start with a simple Cobb-Douglas function:
j = AhLαjMφjH1−αj−φj (18)
where φj is the production share of the M-skill workers. We also use a CES spec-
iﬁcation with three factors, where we use elasticities of substitution between skills
larger than one (i.e. 1.44 and 2).21
Equivalently to the case of L and H-task oﬀshoring, the equilibrium condition
for M-task oﬀshoring is given by:
µv(iM)pMf ≥ pMd (19)
where µ is the general oﬀshoring cost of M-tasks, v(iM) is the oﬀshoring cost function
for M-tasks indexed by iM ∈ [0,1]. This oﬀshoring equilibrium condition results in
the productivity (M-labour cost saving) parameter ΩM.
We include these new M-task oﬀshoring equations into the general equilibrium
MCP system and adjust the cost schedules and include the labour market clearing
conditions for M-skill workers. Again, we use the four speciﬁc cost schedules of
section 3.1. However, since we have now three diﬀerent endowment combinations,
the numerical simulations are based on a variation of the endowment combinations
in Table 1. To maintain a two-dimension endowment set, we assume that the share
of total medium-skill workers is an arithmetic average of the low and high-skill share
of the domestic country.
We ﬁrst model the oﬀshoring changes in the three-skill GRH model as a sequence
of oﬀshoring stages. This sequential oﬀshoring procedure is consistent with the
ﬁndings that oﬀshorability is monotonically decreasing in skill levels (Akcomak et al.,
21 To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical estimates that can inform about the
substitution possibilities between three diﬀerent labour types for developed countries. Thus, there
are no estimates of the elasticity of substitution, nor of the desirability of nested functions. Given
the large amount of combinations that nesting gives, we do not analyse nested functions.
212010). This oﬀshoring sequence is also consistent with the ﬁndings by Costinot et al.
(2010) and Oldenski (2010) that H-skill non-routine tasks are harder to oﬀshore than
routine tasks.
In the ﬁrst stage only L-task are being oﬀshored, in the second stage both L-
task and M-tasks are oﬀshored with the level of L-tasks oﬀshored being higher (i.e.
IL > IM), and in the ﬁnal third stage all three skill tasks are being oﬀshored,
although a hierarchy of oﬀshoring levels is maintained, such that: IL > IM > IH.22
The wage inequality results are presented in Figure 5.23 The ﬁrst row shows
the relative low-skill wage with respect to high-skill wage, the second row shows the
low-skill relative to the medium-skill wage and the last row the medium-skill relative
to the high-skill wage. Each column represents one of the three sequential oﬀshoring
stages and each stage is compared with the previous one. For instance, the ﬁrst
columns shows L-task oﬀshoring with respect to the no-oﬀshoring case. The second
column has both L and M-task oﬀshoring, and the results are compared with stage
1. Finally, the third column has oﬀshoring in all labour skills, and we compare these
results with respect to stage 2. Note that in the graphs relative wage values above
one indicate increases with respect to the previous oﬀshoring stage.
In the ﬁrst column (stage 1) we observe that low-skill wages are decreasing with
respect to both medium and high-skill wages. Thus, this result is in line with the two-
skill model where relative low-skill wages is decreasing (for most cases) when only
L-tasks are being oﬀshored. Moreover, relative medium-skill wages are increasing
with respect to the other two skill wages.
In stage 2 (with both L and M-task oﬀshoring) we observe wage polarization.
Medium-skill wages are decreasing with respect to both low and high-skill wages.
Finally, in the last column (stage 3) we ﬁnd that for many endowment combinations
overall wage inequality is decreasing, since lower skill wages are decreasing to the
higher ones. However, there are some endowment combinations for which this is not
the case, and thus, we cannot generalize this result.
Therefore, using this intuitive oﬀshoring sequence we ﬁnd that the three-skill
extension of the GRH model can produce wage polarization when we allow for both
low-skill and medium-skill tasks to be oﬀshored. In the Appendix we also present
an alternative oﬀshoring sequence (truncated oﬀshoring) where low-skill tasks are
no longer oﬀshorable and only medium and high-skill tasks can be oﬀshored. In this
case, we also ﬁnd wage polarization, and moreover, when both M and H-task are
oﬀshored we ﬁnd an overall decrease in wage inequality for all endowment combina-
tions.
22 In practical terms, each oﬀshoring stage is simulated by changing the general oﬀshoring param-
eters (β for L-tasks, µ for M-tasks and γ for H-tasks). In Stage 1 only L-task oﬀshoring is allowed
and we reduce β by 10%. In Stage 2 we reduce β by 20% and µ by 10%. Finally, in Stage 3, β is
reduced by 30%, µ by 20% and γ by 10%.
23The results shown in this Figure are qualitatively similar with changes in the elasticity of
substitution (σ), diﬀerent production share combinations, and when we use our four oﬀshoring cost
schedules.
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Notes: Left column has Stage 1 (only L-task oﬀshoring), middle column has Stage 2 (both L and
M-task oﬀshoring with IL > IM), and right column has Stage 3 (all skill-types can be oﬀshored,
with IL > IM > IH). Each oﬀshoring stage is compared with the previous, so values above one
represent relative wage increases with respect to the previous stage. Rows indicate diﬀerent relative
wage combinations. Common parameters in all graphs: Non-linear oﬀshoring schedule OC4 (t1 = 1,
t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5), σ = 1.44, αx = 0.2, φx = 0.3, αy = 0.5, and φy = 0.3.
23To sum up, we ﬁnd that in order to reconcile the recent empirical ﬁndings of
wage polarization for the US with the GRH model, we just need three-skill types
and the possibility that medium-skill tasks are oﬀshored. The welfare implications,
however, are very similar to those of the 2x2x2 GRH model: welfare is directly
related to terms-of-trade eﬀects, and is usually increasing.
7 Summary
Oﬀshoring is often associated with declining wages and lost jobs. In their inﬂuential
paper Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) suggest that this may not be always
so. They ﬁnd a special case where low-skill workers in a small but rich (high-
skill abundant) country beneﬁt when low-skill tasks are being oﬀshored. However,
using extensive numerical simulations of their model –which include a wide range
of parameter variation and diﬀerent model speciﬁcations– we ﬁnd that relative low-
skill wages are decreasing in most cases. In this respect, the possibility of relative
low-skill wages increasing when low-skill tasks are being oﬀshored is indeed a very
special case.
In particular, the distributional eﬀects of oﬀshoring are related to country size
(i.e. relative endowments). For small rich countries oﬀshoring is increasing welfare
and reducing wage inequality (the special GRH case), however, for most relatively
medium and big countries we ﬁnd that wage inequality is increasing, while welfare
can also decrease when terms-of-trade are deteriorating. These results are robust
to diﬀerent parameters in the model (i.e. factor shares, elasticities of substitution
between factors), and oﬀshoring speciﬁcations (e.g. diﬀerent oﬀshoring levels, oﬀ-
shoring cost schedules and oﬀshoring stages).
When looking at low-skill abundant (poor) countries the results are somehow
diﬀerent. Oﬀshoring is associated with welfare increases in all our numerical sim-
ulations and for all relative country sizes. However, the distributional eﬀects of
oﬀshoring cannot be generalized and the results are dependent on relative coun-
try size and on the parameters of the model –in particular, the factor shares in
production.
Finally, we also run a wide range of simulations on a variant of the GRH model
with three diﬀerent skill types (low, medium and high). We ﬁnd that this version of
the trade-in-tasks model can reconcile oﬀshoring with a wage polarization pattern
when we allow the possibility to oﬀshore medium-skill tasks. The wage polarization
pattern even holds when M-task oﬀshoring is part of sequential oﬀshoring stages
(preceded by L-task oﬀshoring) or when we have a truncated oﬀshoring stages (no
L-task oﬀshoring allowed). We also ﬁnd that when H-task oﬀshoring is allowed,
there is a general tendency for overall wage inequality to decrease, although this
result does not hold for all relative country sizes.
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278 Appendix
Figure 6: United Kingdom, oﬀshorability index by industries ranked by average
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a Notes: The oﬀshorability index is standardized with mean zero. Education levels are: 1:
Primary; 2: Secondary incomplete; 3: Secondary complete; 4: Tertiary; 5: Post-graduate.
The oﬀshorability index is constructed using detailed UK task data from the
British Skills Survey (BSS, rounds 1997, 2001 and 2006). The occupation-task
speciﬁc index is based on two measures: task-occupation wage diﬀerential and task-
occupation connectivity. The former is based on the diﬀerence between occupation
speciﬁc and task speciﬁc wages. The latter measures how a task is connected to other
tasks in the same occupation. The oﬀshorability index is an interaction of both
measures. For instance, occupations with high task-occupation wage diﬀerentials
and low task-occupation connectivity are more likely to be oﬀshored. To build the
industry-level oﬀshorability index they use a weighted average of occupations using
industry employment data.
288.1 GRH one-country model in a MCP setting
The MCP formulation means that when an equation holds as an equality the com-
plementary variable is positive, and if the equation holds as a strict inequality then
the complementary variable is zero.24
Table 2: General equilibrium system for the one-country GRH model
Inequality Equation Comp. var.
L-tasks oﬀshoring eq.1 βplft(IL) = pLd IL
L-tasks oﬀshoring eq.2 t(IL) = t1 + t2I
t3
L t(IL)





L-tasks oﬀshoring eq.4 ΩL = (1 − IL) +
T(IL)
t(IL) ΩL
H-tasks oﬀshoring eq.1 γpHfz(IH) = pHd IH
H-tasks oﬀshoring eq.2 z(IH) = z1 + z3I
z2
H z(IH)





H-tasks oﬀshoring eq.4 ΩH = (1 − IH) +
Z(IH)
z(IH) ΩH
Zero proﬁts for x 1
A [ΩLpLd]
αx (ΩHpHd)1−αx ≥ pxd x
Zero proﬁts for y 1
A [ΩLpLd]
αy (ΩHpHd)1−αx ≥ pyd y
Expenditure function pλ
xdp1−λ
yd ≥ pw w
Supply ≥ Demand x x + mx ≥ wλpλ−1
xd p1−λ
yd mx
Supply ≥ Demand y y + my ≥ w(1 − λ)pλ
xdp−λ
yd my
Supply ≥ Demand w w ≥ C
pw pw

















(1−IH) − ρ C
Domestic price for x pxd = pxf pxd
Domestic price for y pyd = pyf pyd
Oﬀshoring payments ρ = pLdL IL
(1−IL) + pHdH IH
(1−IH) ρ
where mj is the import (export if negative) of good j, ρ is the oﬀshoring payment
made by the domestic country d to foreign (f) labour.
The ﬁrst eight equations in Table 2 are the oﬀshoring equilibrium conditions
taken from the GRH model. We explain these equations in detail when we deﬁne
the speciﬁc oﬀshoring cost schedules we use (Section 3.1). The other twelve equations
24Note that even if we deﬁne the general equilibrium system as an MCP, some of the equations
below are not strictly speaking complementarity relations. Some of them are simple equalities
associated with system deﬁnitions.
29are standard general equilibrium conditions. In this particular one-country model,
we assume that domestic prices are determined by international prices (pjf).
8.2 GRH one-country model results with non-specialization
In Figure 7 we present the relative changes of four variables of interest. In the x (or
y-axis) oﬀshoring costs are increasing along with decreases in β, and we are varying
the relative labour abundance ratio L/H. In the z-axis we have the variations in the
variables of interest. First, in the upper left graph of Figure 7 oﬀshoring levels are
steadily increasing with reductions in β. Second, welfare is increasing with respect
to L/H (this is expected since changes in L/H are simulated by increasing the
endowment of low-skill labour in the domestic economy). More importantly, there
is a slight increase in welfare when β decreases (and oﬀshoring levels are rising). We
also present changes in sectoral production.
Figure 7: GRH one-country model, changes in oﬀshoring levels, welfare and produc-
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Y 
beta 
Production of Y 
Notes: For presentation reasons the axes in the graph labelled "Production of X" is rotated. Common
parameters in all graphs: σ = 1, αx = 0.2 and αy = 0.7; OC3: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5.
308.3 GRH two-country model in a MCP setting
Table 3: General equilibrium system for the two-country GRH model
Inequality Equation Comp. var.
Zero proﬁts for xdd
1
Ad [ΩLpLd]
αx (ΩHpHd)1−αx ≥ pxd xdd
Zero proﬁts for ydd
1
Ad [ΩLpLd]
αy (ΩHpHd)1−αx ≥ pyd ydd




Hf ≥ pxf xff





Hf ≥ pyf yff
Zero proﬁts for xc1c2 pxc1 ≥ pxc2 xc1c2
Zero proﬁts for yc1c2 pyc1 ≥ pyc2 yc1c2
Expenditure function pλ
xcp1−λ
yc ≥ pwc wc
Supply ≥ Demand xc xc1c1 + xc1c2 − xc2c1 ≥ wλpλ−1
xc p1−λ
yc pxc
Supply ≥ Demand yc yc1c1 + yc1c2 − yc2c1 ≥ w(1 − λ)pλ
xcp−λ
yc pyc
Supply ≥ Demand wc wc ≥ Cc
pwc pwc










































(1−IH) − ρ Cd





(1−IH)) + ρ Cf
Oﬀshoring payments ρ = pLdL IL
(1−IL) + pHdH IH
(1−IH) ρ
We distinguish between the producing (exporting) country c1 and the consuming
(importing) country c2 (e.g. yfd are exports of y from f to d).
Tables 2 and 3 use Cobb-Douglass functions. When we use the CES functions to
check the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of substitution between factors,




[αj(ΩLpLd)1−σj + (1 − αj)(ΩHpHd)1−σj]
1
1−σj (20)
where σj is the elasticity of substitution between both skills in sector j. We assume
that there are no diﬀerences in elasticities between sectors: σx = σy = σ.
31Figure 8: GRH two-country model, changes in oﬀshoring index, with linear oﬀ-




























































































































































High offshoring level 
Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC1: t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC2: t1 = 1, t2 = 4, t3 = 1). Common parameters in
all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
32Figure 9: GRH two-country model, welfare changes with respect to no-oﬀshoring
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High offshoring levels 
Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC1: t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC2: t1 = 1, t2 = 4, t3 = 1). Common parameters in
all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
33Figure 10: GRH two-country model, terms-of-trade (TOT) changes with respect to
no-oﬀshoring scenario, with linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (one per column), at
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Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC1: t1 = 1, t2 = 1, t3 = 1)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC2: t1 = 1, t2 = 4, t3 = 1). Common parameters in
all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
34Figure 11: GRH two-country model, changes in relative wages with respect to no-
oﬀshoring scenario, with non-linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (one per column), at
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Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC3: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC4: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5). Common parameters
in all graphs: σ = 1, αx = 0.2 and αy = 0.7. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
35Figure 12: GRH two-country model, changes in relative wages with respect to no-
oﬀshoring scenario, with extreme production shares, oﬀshoring cost schedule OC3,
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Notes: Left column has production shares: αx = 0.4 and αy = 0.5. Right column has αx = 0.1
and αy = 0.9. Common parameters in all graphs: σ = 1.44, oﬀshoring cost schedule OC3: t1 = 1,
t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with respect to β0, in the medium
and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
36Figure 13: GRH two-country model, changes in relative wages with respect to no-
oﬀshoring scenario, with σ = 3, two diﬀerent oﬀshoring cost schedules (OC2 and
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Notes: Left column has oﬀshoring cost OC2 (t1 = 1, t2 = 4, t3 = 1) and right column has OC3
(t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5). Common parameters in all graphs: σ = 3, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the
low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases
the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
37Figure 14: United Kingdom, oﬀshorability index for 27 industry division, with in-
dustries ranked by average education levels, average values from 1997, 2000 and 2006
dataa










































































a Notes: The oﬀshorability index is the same as in Figure 6 and the index is standardized with
mean zero. Education levels are: 1: Primary; 2: Secondary incomplete; 3: Secondary complete;
4: Tertiary; 5: Post-graduate. Industry codes: AB: Agriculture & ﬁshing; C: Mining; DA: Food,
beverages & tobacco; DBC: Textiles & leather; DD: Wood & wood products; DE: Paper, publishing
& printing; DF: Coke & reﬁned petroleum; DG: Chemicals; DH: Rubber & plastic; DI: Other non-
metallic minerals; DJ: Basic metals; DK: Machinery & equipment nec; DL: Electrical & optical;
DM: Transport equipment; DN: Manufacturing nec E: Electricity, gas & water; F: Construction;
G: Wholesale & retail trade; H: Hotels & restaurants; I: Transport, storage & communication J:
Financial intermediation; K: Real estate, renting & business activities; L: Public administration &
defence; M: Education N: Health and social work; O: Other community, social & personal services;
P: Private households with employed persons.
Source: Akcomak et al. (2010).
388.4 Simulations with both L-task and H-task oﬀshoring
Here we allow for both L-task and H-task oﬀshoring. In particular, we run simulation
when we allow for sequential H-task oﬀshoring, i.e. oﬀshoring of H-tasks follows with
a lag the oﬀshoring of low-skill tasks. This is simulated by setting three stages of γ
decreases, that are related to the low, medium and high L-task oﬀshoring levels used
until now. For the low oﬀshoring level γ is not changing (and there is no H-task
oﬀshoring), but in the medium and high oﬀshoring levels γ is decreased by 2% and
5%, respectively. Although these decreases seem relatively small they translate into
H-task oﬀshoring of around 10% and 15% respectively. Thus, when β is reduced
to increase L-task oﬀshoring, γ will be higher and H-task oﬀshoring will be zero or
lower than L-task oﬀshoring.
From Figure 15 we observe that when we allow both types of oﬀshoring, we
have similar qualitative results as before, but now we have a new set of endowments
where relative low-skill wages are increasing at high oﬀshoring levels. These results
are robust to diﬀerent oﬀshoring cost schedules, diﬀerent α values and our three
main σ values (1, 1.44 and 2).
39Figure 15: GRH two-country model, changes in relative wages with respect to no-
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Notes: Left column has oﬀshoring cost OC3 (t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5) and right column has OC4
(t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5). Common parameters in all graphs: σ = 1, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.6. In the
low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with respect to β0, while γ is not changed. In the medium
and high oﬀshoring cases β is reduced is 20% and 30%, respectively; while γ is reduced by 2% and
5%, respectively.
408.5 Alternative trade-in-tasks models
8.5.1 Simpliﬁed GRH model
We slightly modify the GRH model version from Markusen (2010) by allowing the
home country to be 50% more productive than the foreign country (Ad/Af = 1.5).
Then we run numerical simulations following the same approach as with the GRH
two-country model. For instance, the domestic countries endowments are changed
as in Table 1 and we again run four diﬀerent scenarios with diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs.
For b = 0 we calibrate the value of the trade costs of the low-skill factor-speciﬁc task
so there is no oﬀshoring of this L-task. Then we reduce these trade costs by diﬀerent
percentages. For b = 1 the reduction is of 10% with respect to the trade costs that
assures no oﬀshoring, b = 2 has a 20% and b = 3 a 30% decrease.
The results of this GRH-Markusen model are shown in Figure 16. Since this
is a discrete version of GRH, there are some endowment combinations for which a
decrease in L-task trade costs is not traduced in task oﬀshoring. These areas are the
ﬂat portions in the ﬁrst two rows in Figure 16, where there is no oﬀshoring and thus,
relative wages remain constant (equal to one). However, with a suﬃcient decrease
in L-task trade costs, oﬀshoring increases in the third row of this ﬁgure.
Besides these non-continuous eﬀects, the GRH-Markusen model yields very sim-
ilar results as with the GRH two-country model: when oﬀshoring increases, then
we observe the same pattern of decreasing relative low-skill wages for most of the
endowment combinations, except for those where the domestic country is relatively
very small. These results are robust to changes in the factor shares and for diﬀerent
σ values. The welfare and terms-of-trade eﬀect follow also the same pattern as in
the GRH unmodiﬁed model.
Another diﬀerence between both models, is that given the discontinuities in the
discrete GRH-Markusen model, it is not possible to calibrate the L-task trade costs
so every endowment combination has the same oﬀshoring levels.
41Figure 16: GRH-Markusen model, relative wage changes with respect to no-
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Notes: Left column has σ = 1 and right column has σ = 1.44. Common parameters in all graphs:
αx = 0.2 and αy = 0.7. In the low oﬀshoring cases trade costs are reduced by 10%. In the medium
and high oﬀshoring cases the trade cost reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
428.5.2 Markusen and Venables (2007) model
In Markusen (2010), the Markusen and Venables (2007) model, henceforth MV, is
also modiﬁed to analyse the welfare implications of decreasing trade costs for both
ﬁnal and intermediate goods. The MV model is also set in a 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin
framework, but it has three intermediate inputs (A,B,C), of which A is high-skill
intensive, C is low-skill intensive and B is in the middle. Again we modify the model
to allow productivity diﬀerence between both countries (i.e. Ad/Af = 1.5) and we
run numerical simulations using the same changes in endowment combinations and
in trade costs as with the previous models. In particular, for the MV model we only
change the trade costs of the low-skill intensive intermediate.
In Figure 17 we show the changes in relative wages with diﬀerent oﬀshoring
stages. Again, the pattern of relative low-skill wage changes is similar as before.
However, now the scope of positive changes is bigger. Also note that the scale in the
vertical axis is diﬀerent from previous graphs, and now the positive relative wages
increases are of a much larger magnitude.
Finally, given that this model is also discrete (only three intermediates, instead of
a continuum of tasks as in GRH), it is not possible to calibrate the L-task trade costs
to obtain similar oﬀshoring levels for all endowment combinations. It is important
to note that both these models use a discontinuous oﬀshoring cost function. For
each task (or intermediate input) there is an oﬀshoring cost, but the limited number
of tasks produces a very rigid model where crossing certain trade costs thresholds
produces big changes in oﬀshoring, ﬁnal goods trades and diverse eﬀects on wages.
43Figure 17: Markusen-Venables (2007) model, relative wage changes with respect to
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Notes: Left column has σ = 1 and right column has σ = 1.44. In the low oﬀshoring cases trade
costs are reduced by 10%. In the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the trade cost reduction is 20%
and 30%, respectively.
44Figure 18: GRH two-country model, changes in low-skill real wages with respect to
no-oﬀshoring scenario, with non-linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (one per column),
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Notes: Left column has more sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC3: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5)
and right column less sensitive parameters (OC4: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5). Common parameters
in all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.7. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
45Figure 19: GRH two-country model, L-abundant country, changes in relative wages
with respect to no-oﬀshoring scenario, with linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (one per
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Notes: Left column has less sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC3: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5)
and right column more sensitive parameters (OC4: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5). Common parameters
in all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.7. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
46Figure 20: GRH two-country model, L-abundant country, welfare changes with re-
spect to no-oﬀshoring scenario, with linear oﬀshoring cost schedules (one per col-
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Notes: Left column has less sensitive oﬀshoring cost parameters (OC3: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 1.5)
and right column more sensitive parameters (OC4: t1 = 1, t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5). Common parameters
in all graphs: σ = 1.44, αx = 0.3 and αy = 0.7. In the low oﬀshoring cases β is reduced 10% with
respect to β0, in the medium and high oﬀshoring cases the reduction is 20% and 30%, respectively.
478.6 Truncated oﬀshoring
This oﬀshoring pattern is characterized by no oﬀshoring of low-skill tasks. We
maintain the three stage approach of Section 6 but not allowing for any L-task
oﬀshoring. Thus, in stage 1 there is no oﬀshoring activities. In Stage 2 we only
reduce µ by 10% to allow M-task oﬀshoring, and in stage 3 µ is reduced by 20% and
γ by 10%, so we have IM > IH.
This particular oﬀshoring sequence is consistent with the view that all the L-tasks
that could have been oﬀshored have already been oﬀshored. Thus, the remaining
L-tasks performed in the domestic country are tasks that require physical proximity
and/or personal face to face contact, and thus, their oﬀshorability is not dependent
on international wage diﬀerentials. This follows the view of Blinder (2006) that
oﬀshorability is directly related to physical proximity.25
The simulation results for the truncated oﬀshoring stages are presented in Figure
21. In the ﬁrst column (stage 2) we only allow for M-task oﬀshoring, and we obtain a
wage polarization pattern: medium-skill wages are losing relatively to both low and
high-skill wages. For the second column (with both M and H-task oﬀshoring) we
observe an overall wage inequality increase, since for most of the endowment com-
binations, lower skill wages are decreasing to the higher ones. The only exceptions
are some endowment combinations where PMd/PHd < 1, i.e. medium-skill wages
are decreasing with respect to high-skill wages.
25This is also closely related to the setting used in Ottaviano et al. (2010) where manually low-
skill tasks are performed domestically (in their US case) by immigrant workers. It also ﬁts with the
task routinization process suggested by Autor et al. (2003). In this setting, skill levels and tasks
are matched in the following way: low-skill workers perform manual tasks and/or tasks that need
physical proximity, medium-skill workers do routine tasks and high-skill workers do non-routine
tasks. Using this classiﬁcation one can assume that mostly routine M-tasks are oﬀshorable.
48Figure 21: GRH model with three factors, changes in relative wages with a truncated
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Notes: Left column has truncated stage 2 oﬀshoring: only M-task oﬀshoring and results are com-
pared with no-oﬀshoring case. Right column has truncated stage 3 oﬀshoring: both M and H-task
oﬀshoring (with IM > IH) and results are compared with stage 2. Rows indicate diﬀerent relative
wage combinations. Common parameters in all graphs: Non-linear oﬀshoring schedule OC4 (t1 = 1,
t2 = 7, t3 = 2.5), σ = 1.44, αx = 0.2, φx = 0.3, αy = 0.5, and φy = 0.3.
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